Abstract:
Within the filed of embodied intelligence, it is well known that high behavioural complexity, seen from the external observer perspective, does not necessarily imply high control complexity. This complexity gap is a result of two different frames of reference. More precisely, the intrinsic view of the agent, which provides the basis for its control, can greatly differ from the (extrinsic) view of an external observer. This insight is closely related to Uexküll’s Umwelt concept. In my talk, I will present a measure-theoretic formalisation of this concept and discuss its implications. The formalisation is based on a causal model of the agent’s sensorimotor loop, which corresponds to Uexküll’s notion of a function circle.
Reference:
N. Ay, W. Löhr. The Umwelt of an Embodied Agent – A Measure-Theoretic Definition. Theory in Biosciences (2015) 134: 105-116. doi: 10.1007/s12064-015-0217-3.
Agency in the Physical Sciences 